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Comcast and Time Warner are awaiting regulatory responses to their application to merge and become the dominant player in cable television provision in the U.S. If permitted, the combined firm will control about 2/3rd of the broadband cable market and about 40% of the entire broadband market in the U.S. (which is used for both cable and the Internet). Independently, the two firms both have reputations for poor installation and repair services, poor billing and collection practices, high prices, and price increases above inflation levels. No one seriously believes their claims that the merger will be pro competitive, lead to more consumer choice, better service and lower prices. The companies have not been helping their case by appearing to be operations out of control when it comes to their customers.   In recent months customers seeking services have been kept on the phone for hours and forced to undergo forms of psychological abuse while they tried to get the changes they wished.   C

Most media companies claim they are creative, believing that merely producing  content makes them inventive and artistic. Most media firms are not particularly creative, however, and we recognize it daily as we are confronted with formulaic and derivative content of limited quality. But some companies are consistently notable for unique and ground-breaking content that meet higher standards. What makes them successful is their ability to manage creativity. The concept of managing creativity may at first seem like an oxymoron. Anyone who has worked with talented writers, designers, directors, actors, or musicians knows that the muse of creativity is capricious and does not present itself on a predictable schedule. This does not mean it is impossible for an enterprise to manage creativity, however. Organizations that consistently produce highly creative content spend a great deal of effort managing the environment and processes in which creativity takes place. They do so to make certain

The increasing consumption of news on digital platforms is forcing news organizations to rethink their news production cycles and staffing patterns. Most journalists, like other employees, prefer a normal pattern of life—going to work in the morning and leaving work in the afternoon—because it is conducive to social and familial life and enjoying the cultural amenities that communities have to offer. This preference helped keep afternoon newspapers the standard in the U.S. until 2000, when morning newspapers surpassed afternoon papers for the first time.   Even before that time, however, news production cycles and staffing patterns brought the majority of journalists to the office in the daytime hours, with the number of staff in newsrooms dwindling until morning papers “went to bed” about midnight. Most newsrooms then turned off the lights, and only a few larger metro papers sometimes kept a skeletal crew of police/fire reporters and photographers in the newsroom overnight. That staff

Changes in news production and journalistic employment are often simplistically explained as the results of technology, recent economic conditions, or changes in audience preferences. All these factors have played roles, but a more fundamental and consequential shift is altering the nature of news work and news production. For more than a hundred years news production has been characterized by the industrial mode of production in which news factories mass produced news. They brought together the resources and equipment necessary for gathering and disseminating news and they relied on trained and professionalized news workers. The product became property exchanged in markets, with geographical, market, and economic factors constraining competition to provide news products. Although some elements of that production mode remain in place, one can observe news provision splitting into two new production modes—a service mode and a craft production mode. These have enormous implications for t